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Abstract
With this cursory description of the European Council prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, this Essay
turns to the major changes produced by that treaty. Space considerations require a limited focus.
Part I discusses the impact of the European Council’s new status as one of the institutions of the
European Union (”EU”). Part II considers its designated power to take by qualified majority vote
many important legally-binding decisions. Part III reviews two of its major roles: deciding when
the Treaties should be amended and setting the procedure for amendment, and determining the
timing and terms of accession of candidate nations. Part IV discusses the status and role of the
new President of the European Council.
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Jean-Claude

Piris served for over twenty years as Director
General of the Legal Service of the Council, and accordingly as
the effective general counsel of both the Council and the
European Council. Skilled lawyers tend to act not only as advisors
on technical legal issues or as the drafters of legally precise texts
and opinions, but also as counselors on policy issues. When one
considers that Jean-Claude Piris became Director General prior
to the creation of the European Union and has served during a
twenty-year period in which the European Union and the
European Community have undergone extraordinary changes in
composition, structure, and operations, then the importance of
his contributions becomes manifest. It is highly appropriate that
this Essay should reflect on the changes wrought by the Treaty of
Lisbon to the European Council ("Lisbon Treaty"), which he has
served so well.
INTRODUCTION: FROM THE HAGUE SUMMIT TO THE PRELISBON EUROPEAN COUNCIL
In December 1969 at The Hague, President Georges
Pompidou of France and Chancellor Willy Brandt, together with
the Prime Ministers of Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands, held a two-day summit meeting to consider crucial
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issues confronting the still young European Economic
Community ("EEC").' They succeeded in achieving agreement
on the commencement of negotiations with Denmark, Ireland,
and the United Kingdom for their accession, and upon the
principle that the EEC should obtain its own financial resources
from customs duties and other sources, rather than relying upon
periodic contributions from the Member States or upon certain
Common Agricultural Policy issues. The success of the summit
quite naturally inspired further such gatherings.
Although the next two summits at Paris and Copenhagen
produced no comparable achievements, that held at Paris in
December 19742 under the leadership of President Valery
Giscard d'Estaing of France and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of
Germany was eminently successful, endorsing the direct election
of the European Parliament, inaugurating a policy for regional
development aid, and endorsing various legislative action
programs. The Paris summit also agreed upon a regular pattern
of three summit meetings a year. President Giscard d'Estaing
coined the name "European Council" for such summit
meetings.3 After the European Council invited Commission
President FranCois-Xavier Ortoli to its March 1975 Dublin
meeting,4 the customary participation of Commission presidents
in European Council meetings commenced. That the inclusion
of the president of the Commission as essentially a nonvoting
member of the European Council has proved highly beneficial
was markedly demonstrated by the influence of President Jacques

* Alpin J. Cameron Chair, Professor of Law and Director of the Center on
European Union Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. For an overview of this dramatic summit and its success, particularly in ending
the French veto of the accession of the UK, see Professor Desmond Dinan's description
of the early history of the EU in DESMOND DINAN, EVER CLOSER UNION 39-45 (4th ed.
2010).
2. For an overview of the Paris summit, see the recent comprehensive study, JAN
wERTS, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL 10-12 (2008).
3. President Giscaird d'Estaing was quoted in the press as saying, "Les sommets
sont morts, vive le Conseil Europ6en." ["The Summits are dead, long live the European
Council."]. WERTS, supra note 2, at 11.
4. See MARTIN WESTLAKE & DAVID GALLOWAY, THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 176 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing the composition of the European Council).
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Delors during 1985-1995,5 and by that of other vigorous
Commission presidents, such as RoyJenkins andJose Barosso.
The Single European Act's ("SEA") Article 2 brought the
European Council into the treaty framework, indicating that it
should be composed of the Heads of Government or of State (to
accommodate France, and later Finland), together with the
President of the Commission, and prescribing mandatory
biannual meetings.6 Article 4 of Maastricht's Treaty on European
Union ("Maastricht TEU") replicated this, and added that the
Member State government that held the rotating presidency of
the Council of Ministers would provide the presidency of the
European Council during the same six-month period.7 Article 4
also enunciated the European Council's dual role: to "provide
the Union with the necessary impetus for its development" and
to "define the general political guidelines."8 However, prior to
the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council's policy decisions and
resolutions had to be implemented either by a formal Council
decision or by Commission action in implementation of a policy
request by the European Council.9
The Maastricht Treaty also made innovative amendments to
the European Economic Community Treaty, renamed as the
Treaty Establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"),
which gave the European Council specific roles: to adopt
"common strategies" in the Common Foreign and Security Policy
("CFSP") (Maastricht TEU Article 13(2)), to adopt conclusions
on broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member
States and the Community (EC Treaty Article 99), to adopt
5. For a description of the unusually high level of influence of President Delors, see
WERTS, supra note 2, at 49.
6. Single European Act art. 2, 1987 O.J. L 169/1, at 4 (amending Treaty
Establishing European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11). Both in
France and in Finland, the constitutional structure shares political and economic power
between the President and the Prime Minister, so that the SEA Article 2 had to add "of
State" to "Heads of Government" to permit both officials to attend meetings.
7. Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text) art. 4, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. C
191/1, at 7 [hereinafter Maastricht TEU].
8. Id.
9. See WERTS, supra note 2, at 30; FIONA HAYEs-RENSHAW & HELEN WALLACE, THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 174 (2d ed. 2006). The Court of First Instance (now the General
Court) held that the European Council had no power to take a legally-binding decision.
See Roujansky v. Council, Case T-584/93, [1994] E.C.R. 11-585 (challenging to the
European Council's proclamation that the Maastricht TEU entered into force on
November 1, 1993).
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similar conclusions on employment policy (EC Treaty Article
128), and, formally acting as the Council, to decide upon the
qualifications of Member States eligible to transfer their
monetary policy control to the European Central Bank within the
European Monetary Union, and to adopt the euro (EC Treaty
Article 121).
For the last twenty years, the European Council has met
twice in each Member State's six month rotating presidency,
reaching "quasi-constitutional" agreements on when to open an
Intergovernmental Conference ("IGC") or to resolve contentious
issues in order to achieve treaty amendments; 0 deciding when to
commence accession negotiations, setting the conditions for
accession, and determining when accession should occur for
particular candidates;" and adopting major policy initiatives,
such as the endorsement of the Commission's action program to
achieve the internal market at the Milan European Council
meeting in June 1985,12 the Tampere European Council's

10. Thus, the European Council meeting at Milan in June 1985 agreed upon the
Intergovernmental Conference ("IGC") that drafted the Single European Act ("SEA"),
see Milan European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no. 6 (1985),
that at Strasbourg in December 1989 agreed upon two IGCs, one to shape European
Monetary Union and the other to revise the EC Treaty, see Strasbourg European
Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no. 12 (1989), and that at Brussels
in June 2007 agreed upon the basic form of the Treaty of Lisbon and called the IGC to
draft its final text, see Brussels European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U.
BULL., no. 6 (2007). The European Council meeting at Maastricht in December 1991
reached the compromises essential to complete the Treaty of Maastricht, see Maastricht
European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no. 12 (1991), as did that
held at Amsterdam in June 1997 to enable the conclusion of drafting the Treaty of
Amsterdam, see Amsterdam European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U.
BULL., no. 6 (1997), and that at Nice in December 2000 to reach the compromises
crucial for the final text of the Treaty of Nice, see Nice European Council, Conclusions
of the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no. 12 (2000).
11. In addition to the December 1969 Hague Summit's decision to authorize
accession negotiations with Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, the
Fountainebleau summit in June 1984 setJanuary 1986 as the accession date for Portugal
and Spain. See DINAN, supra note 1, at 77. The June 1992 European Council at Lisbon
held up negotiations for the entry of Austria, Finland, and Sweden until the Maastricht
Treaty was signed and a new multi-year budget approved. See id. at 106. The
Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 set May 1, 2004 as the entry date for
ten Central European and Mediterranean nations. The European Council has also set
conditions for accession, notably the "Copenhagen criteria" or conditions for the
accession of the Central European nations set by the Copenhagen European Council in
June 1993. See id. at 137.
12. DINAN, supra note 1, at 78-80.
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adoption of the Action Program in the Area of Freedom, Security
and Justice in October 1999,13 and the Lisbon European
Council's creation of the Strategy for Employment, Economic
Reform and Social Cohesion in March 2000.'1
It should be emphasized that although the European
Council has always been an intergovernmental body, acting by
consensus, its policy decisions have significantly furthered the
progress of European integration, rather than acting as a brake
on such integration. 5 Philippe de Schoutheete has accurately
observed: "The European Council has largely fashioned the
Union as we know it today .... [E]ven if the European Council is
basically intergovernmental in nature, the system it has so largely
contributed to is not mainly intergovernmental."1 6 In their study
of the European Council, Westlake and Galloway have accurately
observed that the European Council has taken "most of the
major political decisions of the European Community,"
including the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union
("EMU"), the endorsement of the SEA and the Maastricht
Treaty, German unification, and further enlargements.II
With this cursory description of the European Council prior
to the Treaty of Lisbon, this Essay turns to the major changes
produced by that treaty. Space considerations require a limited
focus. Part I discusses the impact of the European Council's new
status as one of the institutions of the European Union ("EU").
Part II considers its designated power to take by qualified
majority vote many important legally-binding decisions. Part III
reviews two of its major roles: deciding when the Treaties should
be amended and setting the procedure for amendment, and
determining the timing and terms of accession of candidate
nations. Part IV discusses the status and role of the new President
of the European Council.

13. WERTS, supra note 2, at 133-35; see also Dinan, supra note 1, at 537-39.
14. WERTS, supra note 2, at 131-33; see also WESTLAKE & GALLOWAY, supra note
181-83.
15. Westlake and Galloway cogently remark: "[F]ar from discouraging
European Commission from embarking on major integrationist projects,. .
European Council encouraged it in this role." WESTLAKE & GALLOWAY, supra note
179.
16. Philippe de Schoutheete, The European Council, in INSTITUTIONS OF
EUROPEAN UNION 57 (John Peterson & Michael Shackleton eds., 2d ed. 2006).
17. WESTLAKE & GALLOWAY, supra note 4, at 177.
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I.

THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AS AN INSTITUTION

Although formally recognized as a body by the SEA and the
Maastricht Treaty, the European Council was not listed as one of
the Community's political institutions in EC Treaty Article 4.
Given the importance of the European Council's role in the
1990s and this century, both in taking the decisions allotted to it
in the treaties and in providing policy guidance at the highest
The
anomalous.
increasingly
has become
this
level,
characterization of the European Council as an EU institution in
the Lisbon TEU's Article 13 can accordingly be seen as a
welcome recognition of an operational reality. As Mr. Piris has
observed: "The increasing powers and influence [of] the
European Council [are] not due to legal provisions of a given
Treaty, but to political reality."18 He further observed that "the
European Council [has now] become an institution alongside or,
to put it better, above the Council." 19 The European Council has
been brought into the EU structure with the other institutions,
not left in some ambiguous penumbra.
The Lisbon TEU's Article 15 provides a highly desirable
precision in the description of the European Council's
composition, role, and mode of action, supplemented by other
provisions that state its capacity to take specific decisions on
institutional matters. Article 15(1) indicates that its fundamental
role has changed to some degree: it no longer provides "political
guidelines," presumably essential to the other institutions, but
rather "define [s] . . . general political directions and priorities," 0

which would seem to indicate an even more functional policysetting role. Moreover, the European Council can now take
decisions that have legally binding effect-although an
important caveat, in Article 15(1), that it "shall not exercise
legislative functions," prevents it from supplanting the
Parliament, Council, and Commission in their respective roles in
the legislative process.21 (Note that even in the "emergency
brake" provisions in the legislative procedure for directives
18. JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE LISBON TREATY: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 236
(2010).
19. Id.
20. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 15(1), 2010 O.J. C
83/13, at 23 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon].
21. Id.
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concerning judicial cooperation in criminal matters-Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU") Articles
82(3), 83(3), and 86(1)-when the Council legislative discussion
is suspended in order to refer issues to the European Council,
the European Council may not itself amend or revise any draft
text.)
The Lisbon TEU's Article 15(2) naturally modifies the
composition of the European Council in order to include its
President as a nonvoting member and to refer to the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy as "tak[ing] part in its work."" Article 15(3) continues the
policy of two meetings every six months, with occasionally added
"special meetings" (such as that held in September 2001 to adopt
anti-terrorist policies after the 9/11 terrorist attack in New
York23 ). Article 15(3) does make a noteworthy change in
eliminating the automatic assistance of the Ministers for Foreign
Affairs at each meeting that had been provided for in the
Maastricht TEU Article 4. Instead, the present text declares that
the European Council members may each decide to be "assisted
by a minister."24 This reflects current practice, enabling the
Economic and Finance ("ECOFIN") ministers to attend "when
the agenda so requires," as they have frequently had occasion to
do in recent years, or perhaps the Agriculture, Environment,
Justice, or other ministers.
It should be noted that the Conclusions of the 2002 Seville
European Council continue to govern the operational structure
of meetings,2 5 so that the European Council members may have
only one minister to assist them at any given time in a
meeting-indeed European Council meetings always include a
session in which only the Heads of State and Government
participate (apart, of course, from interpreters and a limited

22. Id.
23. For a description of the meeting and consequent Council action, see WERTS,
supra note 2, at 135-36 and Extraordinary Brussels European Council, E.U. BULL., no. 9
(2001).
24. TEU post-Lisbon, supranote 20, art. 15(3), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 23.
25. See Seville European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no. 6,
Annex (2002). The Conclusions of the June 21-22, 2002 European Council meeting at
Seville are also annexed to HAYES-RENSHAW & WALLACE, supra note 9, at 362-63. See
generally DINAN, supra note 1, at 208-10; HAYES-RENSHAW & WALLACE, supra note 9, at
180-83 (describing the customary format of European Council meetings).
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technical support staff). The European Council adopted formal
Rules of Procedure2 6 on December 1, 2009, shortly after the
effective date of the Treaty of Lisbon. The Rules of Procedure
stipulate that the Council shall meet in Brussels, customarily for
two days in private sessions, with delegations limited in size to
twenty persons.2 7 The General Affairs Council has an important
auxiliary role in assisting the president of the European Council
in preparing an agenda and drafting the text of possible
Conclusions.
Article 15(4) continues to prescribe that the European
Council customarily acts "by consensus." Decision by consensus is
the norm for the European Council's role in defining "political
directions and priorities" in the EU generally, and in its
identification of the Union's "strategic interests" and
"guidelines" in the CFSP. 3 However, TFEU Article 235(1) states
that a European Council member's abstention shall not prevent
the European Council from taking an act that requires
unanimity, 29 rather like an abstaining Member State's use of a
"constructive abstention" that permits the others to adopt a
decision by unanimity within the CFSP under TEU Article 31(1).
Presumably, on occasion Member States will not formalize a
dissent from a consensus, permitting the European Council to
adopt Conclusions concerning the issue discussed.
One immediate consequence of becoming an institution is
that the Court of Justice of the European Union has acquired the
power to review European Council decisions for their
compatibility with the treaty under TFEU Article 263 when the
acts are "intended to produce legal effects vis-A-vis third
parties,"3 0 or to review under TFEU Article 265 a complaint that
the European Council has failed to act when it had a duty to do
so. Although either proceeding is highly unlikely, the availability
of judicial review may serve to enforce optimal procedural
regularity in the decisions the Lisbon Treaty now allots to the
European Council. Presently unforeseen circumstances may at

26. Council Decision No. 2009/882/EU (Rules ofProcedure), 2009 0.J. L 315/51.
27. Id. art. 4, at 53.
28. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 21, art. 26, 2010 0.J. C 83, at 31.
29. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 235(1), 2010 0J. 83/47, at 152-53.
30. Id. art. 263, at 162.
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some point occasion a Court review of a European Council
decision. 3 '
II. ACTIONBY QUALIFIED MAJORITY VOTE ("QMV")
One of the most important innovations of the Lisbon Treaty
is its specification of many significant operational decisions that
the European Council may now take by a qualified majority vote
(calculated in the same manner as a vote taken in the Council
pursuant to TFEU Article 238(2)).
Thus, the European Council will now act by a QMV in
electing its president (TEU Article 15(5)); in designating the
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy (TEU Article 18(1)), but "with the agreement of
the President of the Commission," a proviso necessary because
the High Representative wears the dual hat of vice-president of
the Commission, and all nominees for the status of commissioner
must be chosen "by common accord" with the Commission
president; in nominating a candidate for president of the
Commission (TEU Article 17(7)), who then must obtain the
approval of the Parliament; in appointing the entire Commission
as a body (TEU Article 17(7)), after the Parliament has approved
them through a "vote of consent"; and in designating the
president and members of the Executive Board of the European
Central Bank ("ECB") (TEU Protocol 4 on the Statute of the
European System of Central Banks and the European Central
Bank" Article 11(2)).
The European Council's ability to nominate the president of
the Commission by a QMV vote is particularly important because
several qualified prime ministers or former prime ministers were
vetoed as prospective Commission presidents for terms starting in
31. That the European Central Bank ("ECB") should ever be the subject of a
proceeding before the Court of Justice of the European Union ("Court of Justice" or
"Court") also initially seemed unlikely, but the Court had to define and delimit the
nature of the ECB's independence in Commission v. European Central Bank, Case C11/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-7147. It is conceivable that the Court of Justice might have to
decide whether the European Council has a treaty-granted power to take a particular
legally-binding decision, or whether it has infringed the Council's power to take
legislative action.
32. Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, Protocol (No. 4) on the Statute of the European
System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank, 2010 0.J. C 83/01, at 230.
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1995 and 1999 by either France, Germany, or the UK.-3 Of
course, it remains to be seen whether large Member States will
continue to employ a sort of "Luxembourg veto" of prospective
Commission presidents despite the treaty authorization for Q.MV
voting.
TFEU Article 236 prescribes that the European Council
shall act by QMV in taking two other important operational
decisions: establishing the list of permissible configurations of
the Council, and setting the sequence of rotation of the six
month presidencies of the Council. Although the rotation of
presidencies is currently set through 2020 by a 2004 Council
decision,3 4 and the Seville European Council's limitation of
Council configurations to nine is currently not questioned, at
some point both subjects will require a new decision.
In contrast, the Lisbon Treaty requires the European
Council to act by unanimity on certain institutional issues of a
fundamental character. The prime example is a European
Council Decision on the composition of the European
Parliament, i.e., the size of each Member State's delegation, for
which the Lisbon TEU Article 14(2) requires unanimity. In view
of the difficult discussions on this issue in Intergovernmental
Conferences and in accession negotiations in the past, often only
resolved at contentious European Council meetings,35 the issue is
so obviously a sensitive one that the requirement for a
unanimous decision is not surprising. This is also true of the
Lisbon TEU Article 17(5)'s requirement for a unanimous
33. See WERTS, supra note 2, at 136-39 (citing the UK veto of Belgian Prime
Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene and Germany's veto of Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers
as successor to President Jacques Delors, and the UK veto in 1999 of Belgian Prime
Minister Guy Verhofstadt as the successor to President Jacques Santer.). Also, president
Jacques Chirac of France initially blocked in May 1998 the European Council's
designation of Wim Duisenberg, then the highly-respected president of the Netherlands
Central Bank, as the first president of the European Central Bank, until he obtained
agreement that Duisenberg would retire before the end of that stated six-year term and
thatJean-Claude Trichet, president of the Bank of France, should be his successor.
34. The European Council acted in 2009 to set the rotation, divided into blocks of
three successive presidencies, or "trios," until 2020. Council Decision No.
2009/881/EU, 2009 O.J. L 315/50. The "trios" are intended to promote continuity
through cooperation among the successive presidencies. See PIRIS, supra note 18, at 21011.
35. The issue was particularly acute in allocating Member State delegations at the
December 2000 Nice European Council meeting in anticipation of the Central
European enlargement. See DINAN, supranote 1, at 237-41.
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decision by the European Council in setting a system of rotation
of Commission members among the Member States when the
Commission membership should be reduced to two-thirds of the
Member States. However, the European Council adopted a
Decision in December 2008, reiterated at the European Council
meeting in June 2009,36 that this provision should not be carried
out, a Decision taken in order to ensure that Ireland would not
lose its Commissioner at any time, a subject of great concern to
Irish voters in the prospective October 2009 Irish referendum on
the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. The Decision was
presumably taken pursuant to the Lisbon TEU's Article 17(5),
which authorizes the European Council, by unanimous action, to
alter the two-thirds number. Another instance where the
European Council must act by unanimity, but is highly unlikely
ever to have occasion to do so, is in the determination under the
Lisbon TEU's Article 7(2) that a Member State has committed a
"serious and persistent breach" of the fundamental Union values
stipulated in the Lisbon TEU's Article 2, notably those of
democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law.
Apart from setting its own rules of procedure under TFEU
Article 235(3), the European Council is authorized to act by a
simple majority vote on one major decision, that of creating a
convention or calling an IGC in order to amend the Treaties.
The Maastricht TEU's Article 49 authorized the Council to call
an Intergovernmental Conference to amend the Treaties, but did
not specify a voting requirement, which implicitly meant a simple
majority vote would suffice. Indeed, the decision to call the
Luxembourg IGC to amend the Treaties by the Single European
Act was adopted at the June 1985 Milan European Council
meeting despite the opposition of Denmark, Greece, and the
UK 37 Moreover, the European Council decision at Strasbourg to

36. Brussels European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no. 12
(2008); Brussels European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no. 6
(2009); see also Editorial, An Ever Mighty European Council--Some Recent Institutional
Developments, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1383, 1386-87 (2009) (observing that the
European Council's June 2009 Decision foresees that it will become part of a protocol to
be adopted simultaneously with the next accession treaty).
37. See Milan European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no. 6
(1985); WERTS, supra note 2, at 87 (observing that in order to call the IGC, a prerogative
of the Council, the European Council acted as the Council in its composition of Heads
of State and Government); see also DINAN, supra note 1, at 80.
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call an IGC to amend the EEC Treaty in order to create a
monetary union was taken after Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher indicated that the UK opposed monetary union but
would not hinder the IGC's creation.38

III. MAJOR ROLES OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL
As previously noted, the European Council has always acted
as the highest political and policy-making body of the European
Union, taking many crucial (and sometimes controversial)
decisions furthering its development. The Lisbon Treaty modifies
its operation to some degree in two crucial roles.
First, commencing with the European Council decision to
summon the Luxembourg IGC that drafted the Single European
Act, the European Council has always taken the policy decision
on when to call an IGC and set some guidelines for its agenda.39
The Lisbon TEU's Article 48 sets out new procedures for treaty
amendments and specifies the European Council's important
role in each.
Lisbon TEU Article 48(4) retains an Intergovernmental
Conference as the customary mode of proposing amendments to
the Member States for ratification in accordance with their
constitutional procedures. As previously observed, the European
Council need only act by a majority vote in calling an IGC,
although one may surmise that it will usually act by near
consensus in order to ensure that the amendment process will
ultimately be successful. The IGC itself is stipulated to act by
consensus, a sensible precaution in view of the need to achieve
ratification by all Member States. What is new is the provision in
Article 48(3) that the European Council will in practice usually
call a convention that would draft possible amendments for final
deliberation by an IGC.
A convention was first employed to draft the Charter of
Fundamental Rights ("Charter"). The European Council
meeting at Cologne in June 1999 authorized the drafting of the
Charter and that at Tampere in October 1999 set the
composition of the convention that would prepare it under the
38. See Strasbourg European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL.,
no. 12 (1989); WERTS, supranote 2, at 88.
39. See, e.g., DINAN, supra note 1, at 145-50.
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chairmanship of Roman Herzog, the former president of
Germany. The convention was composed not only of
representatives of Member State governments, but also of a
Commissioner, a delegation from the European Parliament, and
representatives of each national parliament. The convention
worked with remarkable harmony to draft the Charter and
present it to the European Council at Biarritz in October 2000,
which endorsed it. The Charter was formally proclaimed by the
presidents of the Commission, Council, and Parliament during
the European Council at Nice in December 2000. However, the
Charter was not given legal effect until the Lisbon TEU's Article
6 did so. 4 0
This success led to the employment of a convention to
prepare the ill-fated draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe. The European Council meeting at Laeken in December
2001 convened a convention to amend the treaties in order to
better achieve democracy, transparency, and efficiency. The
convention, composed in a manner analogous to the prior
convention, was chaired by former French President Giscard
D'Estaing. The convention's ambitious text was largely endorsed
by an IGC, with final crucial compromises achieved at the
Brussels European Council, held under the Irish Presidency of
Prime Minister Ahern, in June 2004. After signature at Rome on
October 29, 2004, the draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe was ratified by fourteen Member State parliaments, but
was abandoned after heavily adverse referenda in France and the
Netherlands in 2005.41 Although media reports indicated that the
negative votes were motivated in part by the unpopularity of the
French and Dutch governments, and by voter dissatisfaction with
EU policies on agriculture and the free movement of workers,
considerations that had nothing to do with the draft
Constitutional Treaty, certainly some voters felt that "federalist"
elements in the text went too far.
While one might have thought that that experience would
have suggested the advisability of employing only IGCs in the
preparation of treaty amendments, because they would be less
apt to accept amendments that might not be endorsed in the
40. See GEORGE A. BERMANN, ROGER J. GOEBEL, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ELEANOR M.

FOX, EUROPEAN UNION LAw 208-10 (3d ed. 2011).
41. See DINAN, supra note 1, at 145-50.
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ratification process, the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty obviously
felt that conventions do provide a worthwhile mode of obtaining
input from qualified persons who do not only represent Member
State government views. Article 48(3) specifies that a convention
is to be composed of representatives of national parliaments, the
European Parliament, and the Commission, as well as
representatives of the governments.
The TEU's principal innovation in Article 48(6) and (7) is
to enable amendments by European Council action in a
"simplified revision procedure." Acting upon a proposal
presented by any Member State, the Commission, or the
Parliament, the European Council may amend, by unanimous
action, any provision, or part thereof, in Part III of the TFEU.
Inasmuch as Part III sets out all of the substantive fields of action
of the EU (except for the CFSP), the European Council's power
of amendment, without calling an IGC, could have great practical
impact. Moreover, the European Council is specifically
empowered to decide, again unanimously, to authorize the
European Council to act by a QMV rather than unanimity in any
decision taken in a Part III field of action, and even in the CFSP.
Obviously, any such amendment would still require ratification
by all Member States. Nonetheless, both modes of European
Council action reflect a desirable pragmatic effort to accelerate
the procedure for the adoption of specific amendments in
particular fields.
Second, as previously noted, the European Council has
always exercised a crucial role in authorizing negotiations with
candidate nations, in setting essential terms for their accession,
and in determining the date of accession. Thus, the initial 1969
Hague summit decision to authorize European Council
negotiations for accession with Denmark, Ireland, and the UK
led to the first enlargement of the EEC. Undoubtedly, the most
noteworthy illustration of the role of the European Council in
the accession process occurred with regard to the twelve Central
European and Mediterranean nations that became Member
States in 2004 and 2007. The June 1993 Copenhagen European
Council set the famous three enlargement conditions or
criteria-political, economic, and infrastructure-for the
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ultimate accession of these nations. 42 Subsequent European
Council meetings at Luxembourg in November 1997 and at
Helsinki in December 1999 authorized the launch of
negotiations with the twelve candidate nations, and that in
Copenhagen in December 2002 set the date of May 1, 2004 for
the entry of ten of the candidates.4 3 Recent European Council
meetings have authorized negotiations with Croatia and Turkey
for their accession.
Given this background, the Lisbon Treaty amendment to
TEU Article 49, which governs the accession procedure, is
decidedly modest, adding only: "The conditions of eligibility
agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into
account" by the Council when acting unanimously to approve a
new Member State.44 It is not clear why the requisite approval
should not be given by the European Council, which presumably
is providing the crucial policy decision that the Council merely
formally adapts.
An interesting innovation of the Lisbon Treaty that is
immediately relevant is TEU Article 50, which for the first time
sets a procedure for the voluntary withdrawal of a Member State
from the Union. Although withdrawal is only a remote
contingency, it is certainly sensible to provide a constitutional
mechanism for its occurrence. Again, the European Council is to
provide "guidelines" for the negotiations between the Council
and the withdrawing Member State on the terms of withdrawal.
IV. THE PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL
One of the most important innovations of the Lisbon TEU is
the creation of the post of president of the European Council.
The draft Constitutional Treaty initially proposed the office, and
its text was essentially reiterated in the Lisbon Treaty. TEU
Article 15(5) stipulates that the European Council shall elect its
president by a QMV vote for a two and one-half year term,
renewable once. Pursuant to TEU Article 15(6), the president
shall chair European Council meetings and "drive forward its

42. Id. at 137.
43. See WERTS, supra note 2, at 114-16.
44. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Communities art. 1(57), 2007 O.J. C 306/01, at 40.
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work," "endeavor to facilitate [its] cohesion and consensus," and
provide continuity between meetings. In all these functions, the
president is to cooperate with the president of the Commission
and coordinate with the General Affairs Council, which
customarily helps prepare the agenda of meetings and the text of
resolutions or decisions. The president also is to present a report
to the Parliament after each meeting, in effect representing the
European Council to the Parliament.
The president is accordingly capable of exerting
considerable influence upon European Council operations in
general and specific decisions in particular. Political Science
commentators emphasize the influence that presidencies of the
Council and of the European Council have exerted in the past,
notable through setting an agenda and leading discussion in
relatively short meetings.4 5 An adroit president can enhance this
influence through regular visits to key Member State
governments between European Council meetings. A president's
ability to convene an emergency session of the European Council
is also of great practical importance.
Finally, the president is to serve as the formal representative
of the EU within the context of the CFSP, "without prejudice to
the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy." 46 Space considerations prevent any
examination of the practical impact of this role. Suffice it to say
that nations outside the EU are apt to welcome the ability to have
a customary spokesperson of the European Council in
international policy issues, rather than one who rotates every six
months.
The decision to create the post of president was not taken
without debate. The convention that drafted the Constitutional
Treaty was rather divided as to the desirability of the office, and
the issue was raised again in the preparation of the Lisbon
Treaty. Former French President Giscard d'Estaing, as the
convention chair, proposed the post, but seventy-nine out of

45. See especially the studies of Professor Jonas Tallberg, The Agenda-shapingPowers
of the EU CouncilPresidency, 10 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 1, 1-19 (2003); BargainingPower in the
European Council, 46 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 685, 685-708 (2008); The Power of the
Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency and Distribution in EU Negotiations, 42 J. COMMON MKT.
STUD. 999, 999-1022 (2004).
46. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 20, art. 15(6), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 23.
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ninty-one speakers at the convention opposed it.47 France,
Germany, and the UK strongly favored the office, presumably
feeling that a rotating presidency was not as effective, particularly
in confronting major issues that have a considerable time
duration. Most smaller Member State governments preferred a
rotating presidency, presumably concerned that a long term
president was apt to be more influenced by the views of the
larger Member States, as well as being concerned that the new
European Council president might overshadow the president of
the Commission. They were also opposed to the loss of the
rotation of governments in the presidency of the European
Council. In point of fact, some commentators have pointed to
evidence that several smaller Member State governments, notably
those of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and the
successful
held highly
consistently
have
Netherlands,
Presidencies.4 8 In any event, as Mr. Piris has observed, the initial
proposal that the president should have a substantive functional
role as the chair of the General Affairs Council, with the
responsibility for coordinating other Council configurations, was
abandoned, so that the president now only serves as chair of the
European Council.49
The designation of the Belgian Prime Minister, Herman Van
Rompuy, as the initial European Council president came as a bit
of a surprise, as many media commentators had expected former
UK Prime Minister Tony Blair to be named. Apparently the
European Council preferred a less controversial and lowerprofile president.
Since his designation, President Herman Van Rompuy has
been keen to fulfill his duties energetically, while assuaging some
of the concerns felt by smaller Member States about the risks
posed by the post. He has manifested the political skills that
enabled him to be a successful leader of Belgium despite its ongoing internal political divisions. In Professor Dinan's appraisal,
President Van Rompuy "has focused on improving the European
47. See WERTS, supra note 2, at 148-53; see also DINAN, supra note 1, at 224-25.
48. See, e.g., WERTS, supra note 2, at 155-57. In particular, the prime ministers of
smaller Member States have been especially effective in brokering compromises
necessary to achieve a consensus on the text of new treaties (although Germany's
Chancellor Angela Merkel deserves the credit for promoting the compromises necessary
to obtain the final text of the Treaty of Lisbon).
49. PIRIS, supra note 18, at 206-07.
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Council

procedurally

by

tightening

its

agenda,

...

inviting

government ministers only on an ad hoc basis, shortening and
sharpening summit conclusions, and ensuring better followthrough."5 0 President Van Rompuy has been particularly
resourceful and energetic in helping to craft proposals intended
to confront monetary crisis posed by the serious economic
mismanagement of finances in Greece, and the serious
recession's impact on the finances of Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain. He has also been keen to demonstrate collaborative efforts
with Commission President Barosso, ECB President Trichet, and
Euro-Group President Juncker in formulating monetary and
economic proposals. Finally, he has exercised his power to call
emergency sessions of the European Council to deal with the
crisis.

CONCLUSION
In view of its status as the highest political body within the
European Union, this Essay has attempted to review the impact
of the Lisbon TEU concerning the European Council. By
formally designating the European Council as an EU institution,
the Lisbon TEU has, on the one hand, recognized its political
and policy-making role, and, on the other hand, reduced its
intergovernmental character to a significant degree by bringing it
within the constitutional structure of the EU. This reduction in
its intergovernmental character is particularly demonstrated by
its shift to qualified majority voting in so many of its important
decisions, although it will remain to be seen whether in practice
the European Council will actually abide by QMV.
The Essay has also examined the European Council role in
the most fundamental constitutional decision process, that of
making treaty amendments, and noted the potentially valuable
simplified revision process. Finally, the Essay has discussed the
new post of President of the Union, the role of the president, the
controversy over creating the post, and Herman Van Rompuy's
initial execution of his duties as the first president.

50. DINAN, supra note 1, at 226.

